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Peterson: Exemption Stacking in Montana Bankruptcies

NOTE

EXEMPTION STACKING IN MONTANA
BANKRUPTCIES-"WINDFALL" OR "FRESH
START"?
Brady M. Peterson*

"Neithera borrower nor a lender be."1
I. INTRODUCTION

Although Lord Polonius' advice to Laertes in Hamlet may be
sound, it is not often followed in today's world. Borrowing and
lending continue at record rates. 2 Consequences have followed
these patterns. In 2002, there were4 4062 bankruptcy filings in
Montana, 3 and 1,577,651 nationally.
*J.D. Candidate, The University of Montana, 2003; B.A., Brigham Young University,
2000. I would like to thank Elaine Dahl for her invaluable insights and editing
assistance during the production of this note. Thanks also to Cory Gangle and Richard
Samson for their suggestions and commentary. Special thanks to my wife Erika, and
daughters Cassandra and Marie, for their love, support, and understanding throughout
this endeavor.
1.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 1,

sc. 3.
2. American Bankruptcy Institute, U.S. Bankruptcy Filing Statistics, at
http://www.abiworld.org/stats/stats.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
3. American Bankruptcy Institute, Annual Total Bankruptcy Filings by District
for 1990-2002, at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1990annual.html (last visited Apr. 22,
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Congress and state legislatures have enacted laws that
provide a roadmap for consistent treatment of debtors in
bankruptcy proceedings. The United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Montana has consistently applied Montana
law to property exemptions in a bankruptcy proceeding.
However, in In re Zimmerman5 the Montana Supreme Court
ignored precedent and state legislative action. The court based
its holding on a cursory review of the applicable statute, and
created a change in Montana's bankruptcy exemption scheme
that should have been reserved for legislative action.
This note discusses the Montana Supreme Court's
inconsistent holding from In re Zimmerman that joint debtors
6
may "stack" their exemptions in a jointly held piece of property.
Part II gives a brief overview of exemptions, joint bankruptcy
petitions, and exemption stacking. Part III traces stacking
jurisprudence from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Montana, with specific attention to holdings dealing
with § 25-13-609. Part IV reviews Montana Supreme Court
jurisprudence dealing with § 25-13-609, including Zimmerman.
Part V proposes a possible solution to the now murky law of
exemption stacking in Montana.
II. EXEMPTIONS AND "STACKING"
This section discusses bankruptcy exemptions in federal and
Montana law. It further provides a definition and historical
background of exemption "stacking."
A. PropertyExemptions in Bankruptcy
Exemptions are a crucial part of bankruptcy law.7 The
protection of exempt assets from creditor claims is a
fundamental component of a debtor's "fresh start."8 However, a
fair process is also needed to protect creditor interests. To
2003).
4. American Bankruptcy Institute, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2002, at
http://www.abiworld.orglstats/1980annual.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
5. 2002 MT 90, 309 Mont. 337, 46 P.3d 599.

6.

Id.

16.

7. "An exemption is an interest withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the
creditors) for the benefit of the debtor." Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991).
8. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.01 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev.
2002). See also Judge William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of

Exemption Limitations: The "Opt-Out"as Child of the Firstand Parent of the Second, 71
AM. BANKR. L.J. 149, 163 (1997).
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address these two seemingly opposite goals, the federal
government enacted 11 U.S.C. § 522 which allows debtors to
exempt property from the bankruptcy estate, 9 subject to value
limitations. 10 The Bankruptcy Code also gives states the option
to "opt-out" of the federal exemption scheme," and a majority
have enacted their own separate exemption statutes. 12 Montana
3
is one of those states.
The Montana Constitution requires that "[tihe Legislature
shall enact liberal homestead and exemption laws."1 4
In
accordance with this mandate, title 31, chapter 2, part 106 of the
Montana Code 15 "opts out" of the federal exemption provisions
and instead provides a "laundry list"16 of available exemptions
found throughout the Montana Code,' 7 involving everything
from the homestead' 8 to proceeds received from hail insurance

9. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000).
10. Id. § 522(d).
11. Id. § 522(b)(1).
12. COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcy, supra note 8, at § 522.02[1] n.3. COLLIER lists 34
states that have prohibited bankruptcy petitioners in their state from using the Federal
exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). They are Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See also Brown, supra note 8,
at 151 n.ll.
13. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106 (2001).
14. MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
15. As this note will deal extensively with different code sections, title 31, chapter
2, part 106 of the Montana Code will hereinafter be referred to by the short form § 31-2106.
16. "The basis for providing the debtor with a variety of exemptions is to prevent
the debtor and his or her dependents from becoming public charges." In re Glass, 164
B.R. 759, 764 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (citing In re Neal, 140 B.R. 634, 636 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1992)).
17. The complete list of available exemptions under MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106
are:
(1) that property exempt from execution of judgment as provided in 19-2-1004,
19-18-612, 19-19-504, 19-20-706, 19-21-212, Title 25, chapter 13, part 6, 33-7522, 33-15-512 through 33-15-514, 39-71-743, 39-73-110, 53-2-607, 53-9-129,
Title 70, chapter 32, and 80-2-245;
(2) the individual's right to receive unemployment compensation and
unemployment benefits; and
(3) the individual's right to receive benefits from or interest in a private or
governmental retirement, pension, stock bonus, profit-sharing, annuity, or
similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of
service....
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106(1) (2001) (citing title 70, chapter 32 of the
Montana Code).
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claims. 19 Also included in the § 31-2-106 list is title 25, chapter
13, part 609 of the Montana Code, 20 which grants exemptions
subject to value limitations for personal property. 21 Some of the
personal property exemptions mentioned in the statute are for
household furnishings, clothing, a motor vehicle, tools of the
trade, and unmatured life insurance contracts. 22 Many of these
Montana personal property exemptions correspond with the
23
personal property exemptions found in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
Congress has provided that § 522 applies separately to each
debtor in a joint case. 24 Thus, each debtor receives a separate
set of property exemptions under the federal exemption
scheme. 25
However, neither § 31-2-106 nor § 25-13-609
specifically authorizes each debtor to receive a separate set of
personal property exemptions in a joint bankruptcy case in
Montana. The Montana Supreme Court gave this authorization
through its holding in the recent case In re Zimmerman. 26 In
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-2-245 (2001).
20. Hereinafter § 25-13-609.
21. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-609 (2001).
22. All of the exemptions in § 25-13-609 of the Montana Code are listed as follows:
(1) the judgment debtor's interest, not to exceed $4,500 in aggregate value, to
the extent of a value not exceeding $600 in any time of property, in household
furnishings and goods, appliances, jewelry, wearing apparel, books, firearms
and other sporting goods, animals, feed, crops, and musical instruments;
(2) the judgment debtor's interest, not to exceed $2,500 in value, in one motor
vehicle;
the judgment debtor's interest, not to exceed $3,000 in aggregate value, in any
implements, professional books, and tools, of the trade of the judgment debtor
or a dependent of the judgment debtor; and
(3) the judgment debtor's interest, not to exceed $4,000 in value, in any
unmatured life insurance contracts owned by the judgment debtor.
23. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2)-(4), (6), (7) (2000), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 2513-609 (2001).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (2000).
A joint case may only be filed "by an
individual.. and such individual's spouse." 11 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2000).
25. See In re Zimmerman, 2002 MT 90, 8, 309 Mont. 337, 8, 46 P.3d 599, %8.
26. Id. 1 18. Montana Code Annotated § 31-2-106 states "an individual" may claim
the exemptions referenced in the section, but does not refer specifically to the case of
joint debtors.
The Montana Supreme Court in Zimmerman used the AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY to define "individual" as a "single human." Zimmerman, 1 12.
Therefore, the Court found that the statute granted any single human the exemptions
listed in the statute regardless of whether the Bankruptcy petition listed single or joint
debtors. Thus, in the view of the Court, each individual would be entitled to claim the
listed exemptions in §31-2-106. However, one may argue with the Montana Supreme
Court's usage of the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY instead of other dictionaries of
choice. For example, while BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "individual" as "of or
relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group," it further defines "individual"
as "existing as an indivisible entity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 777 (7th ed. 1999).
Therefore, one could also argue that "individual" could refer to joint debtors as an
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addition to allowing joint debtors to each receive a separate set
of exemptions, the court held that when each debtor maintains
an interest in jointly held personal property, each may claim a
separate exemption and "stack" those exemptions on one piece of
27
property.
B. Bankruptcy Exemption "Stacking"
When a husband and wife file a joint bankruptcy petition, a
bankruptcy estate is created for each individual. 28
The
bankruptcy estate "consists of all the interests in property, legal
and equitable, possessed by the debtor at the time of filing, as
well as those interests recovered or recoverable through transfer
and lien avoidance provisions." 29 The federal code and some
state codes entitle each individual debtor to claim a separate set
30
of exemptions for his or her respective bankruptcy estate.
"Stacking" occurs when each bankruptcy estate uses these
separate exemptions on one jointly held piece of property,
essentially doubling the exemption on that piece of property.
Exemption stacking has taken several forms throughout
history. Prior to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, joint debtors could elect to use either
federal or applicable state exemptions. 31 One spouse could use
the federal exemptions, while the other could use the state
exemptions. 32
The joint debtors could then stack these
exemptions on jointly held pieces of property. However, the
1984 Bankruptcy Amendments prohibited this practice by
providing that debtors may not elect to exempt both property
described in the federal § 522(d) exemptions and other property
described in state or other permitted exemption statutes. 33 This
amendment along with subsequent cases clarified that federal-

"indivisible entity." It may have been more appropriate for the Court to follow the
general statutory construction rule found at title 1, chapter 2, part 107 of the Montana
Code and extract the definition for "individual" from another portion of the Code, such as
title 5, chapter 7, part 102, or title 13, chapter 1, part 101, which define "individual" as a
"human being."
27. Zimmerman, 16.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
29. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000). See also supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
31. John M. Franck, Recent Development: Exemptions: Section 522, 3 BANKR. DEV.
J. 269, 280 (1986).
32. Id.
33. Id. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1985), with 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1984)
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state exemption stacking is prohibited. 34
Exemption stacking can also result from the use of "wild
If a debtor has already claimed the
card" provisions. 35
maximum exemption permitted in certain property, many states
allow a debtor to exempt a certain amount of "any other
property."36 First, the debtor exempts an amount of property
under the relevant provision of an exemption statute (e.g., an
automobile). If the exemption amount is not sufficient to cover
the debtor's entire equity in that piece of property, the debtor
of the "wild
may then exempt any remaining equity by virtue
37
card" provision contained in an exemption statute.
An Illinois case, In re Barker,38 provides an example of "wild
Barker filed bankruptcy, and listed an
card" stacking.
exemption of $1,200 in a 1979 Oldsmobile Toronado under the
applicable personal property statute. 39 Barker also listed the
remaining $1,022.72 of equity in the motor vehicle as exempt
under the "wild card" provision of the personal property
exemption statute. 40 The court recognized that the statute was
ambiguous as to whether one could stack the "wild card"
exemption on other exemptions available for pieces of personal
property. 4 1 It then examined the legislative history surrounding
the enactment of the exemption statute, and further found that
personal property exemptions should be liberally construed to
protect debtors. 42 In accordance with this liberal construction,
the court allowed the debtor to stack the "wild card" exemption
34. Franck, supra note 31, at 284. In In re Leys, 49 B.R. 852 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1985), joint debtors filed a bankruptcy petition that claimed one exemption in their
residence through Wisconsin state statutes and another under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
Leys, 49 B.R. at 852. In so doing, the petitioners attempted to exempt the entire amount
of equity in the property by stacking state and federal exemptions. Id. Instead of
deciding whether this type of stacking was permitted, the court resolved the case
through application of the state statute. Id. at 853-54. However, the court stated in
dicta that it was unlikely that the use of both federal and state exemptions would ever be
an issue because of the 1984 Amendments' prohibition of the use of both Federal and
state exemption schemes. Id. at 854 n.6.
35. J. Benjamin Earthman, Note, Making a Bad Situation Worse: Going Against
the Current,Have Tennessee and MississippiFloundered in Their Approach to the "Tools
of the Trade"Exemption?, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 401, 413 (2001).
36. See, eg., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1001(b) (2001). See also 11 U.S.C §
522(d)(5) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-609(1) (2001).
37. See, eg., In re Barker, 768 F.2d 191, 196 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 192.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 195.
42. Id. at 196.
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on the motor vehicle exemption, thereby completely exempting it
4 3
from execution.
While different methods of "stacking" may or may not be
allowed, the practice of "[aillowing debtors to shield expensive
property economically harms creditors, obviously is not
consistent with debt repayment, and appears to abuse the spirit
of bankruptcy policy."4 Approving the use of stacking seems to
support the policy of shielding more expensive assets. It is this
same property that can provide something of value to offset the
losses a creditor will incur in the bankruptcy process. The
Barker case provides a prime example: instead of using the
remaining equity in the motor vehicle to pay creditor claims,
exemption stacking allowed the debtor to shield the asset from
execution.
Further,
different
opinions
on
stacking
between
jurisdictions creates disparate treatment of debtors from state to
state. The United States Constitution mandates Congress to
enact uniform bankruptcy laws, 45 yet each state's ability to "optout"4 6 of the federal exemption scheme creates disharmony as
allowable exemption values differ greatly from state to state, 47
and bankruptcy courts must then interpret whether these
differing state exemption statutes permit stacking. While the
United States Supreme Court has not found the option for the
states to enact their own exemption laws unconstitutional, 48 the
uniformity mandate seems to be suspect because of the ability to
"opt-out" and resulting differences in interpretation of state
exemption statutes.

43. Id.
44. A. Mechele Dickerson, Lifestyles of the Not-So-Rich or Famous: The Role of
Choice and Sacrifice in Bankruptcy, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 629, 681 (1997).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2000).
47. The most striking example of differing exemptions may be the unlimited
homestead exemption provisions of Florida when compared with Delaware, where no
homestead exemption is permitted. Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning up the Pigsty:
Approaching a Consensus on Exemption Laws, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 276 (2000).
48. In Owen v. Owen, the Supreme Court stated that "[niothing in subsection (b)
(or elsewhere in the Code) limits a state's power to restrict the scope of its exemptions;
indeed, it could theoretically accord no exemptions at all." 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991).
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY recognizes "[w]hile this statement is dicta in the decision, it
clearly reflects the Court's view of the scope of a state's power both to opt out of the
federal exemption system of section 522(d), and to limit dramatically its own citizens'
exemption rights." Supra note 8, at § 522.02.
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III. "STACKING" IN THE MONTANA BANKRUPTCY COURT

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Montana has had many occasions to consider debtor arguments
advocating the allowance of exemption stacking. Most stacking
litigation has focused on exemptions contained in the first three
in personal
subparts of § 25-13-609, namely exemptions
49
property.
business
and
vehicles,
property, motor
A. 609(1)-"Wildcard"Exemption Stacking
The Montana Bankruptcy Court judicially created a
Montana "wildcard" exemption in In re Mutchler.50 In Mutchler,
the court stated that the phrase "in any property" from § 25-13609(1) created an exemption in any item of property up to the
statutory $600 limitation, because exemption statutes are to be
was consistent with
construed liberally and this interpretation
51
debtors.
the
for
start"
"fresh
a
allowing
However, the court forbade the use of "wildcard provisions"
to increase the exemption in a single item of property in In re
Neutgens.52 Debtors listed two motor vehicles and three pieces
of farm equipment as exempt under § 25-13-609(3). 53 The court
disallowed the exemptions as claimed. Instead, the court
allowed exemptions for only one piece of farm equipment under
a
the § 25-13-609(3)(c) tools of the trade exemption, and allowed 54
$1,200 exemption in one motor vehicle under § 25-13-609(2).
The court also noted that the debtors could claim a $600
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-609(1)-(3) (2001).
50. 95 B.R. 748 (Bankr. Mont. 1989). However, the Montana wildcard exemption
has now been specifically disallowed in the case In re Siegle, 257 B.R. 591 (Bankr. Mont.
2001). While the Siegle court recognized the policy that exemption laws should be
construed liberally, it also recognized that a court's primary objective is to implement
legislative intent. By reviewing the different clauses and punctuation patterns of § 2513-609, the court found that the $4,500 amount was meant to set the aggregate value of
items that could be exempted in all categories listed in the statute, while the $600 value
"in any item of property" set the limitation on the items in each category listed in the
statute. The court took note that the Montana code did not have a corresponding
exemption to the Federal "wildcard exemption" found in section 522(d)(5), while several
other parts of § 25-13-609 did have corresponding exemptions in section 522. It also
noted the inaction of the Montana Legislature in clarifying whether a "wildcard
exemption" existed. Thus, while recognizing the policy of liberally construing exemption
laws, the court found that a plain meaning reading of the statute led to the conclusion
that no wildcard exemption exists under § 25-13-609(1). Id. at 598-99.
51. In re Mutchler, 95 B.R. at 755.
52. 126 B.R. 91 (Bankr. Mont. 1989).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 93.
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wildcard exemption in any item of property, but specifically
forbade stacking the wildcard exemption on any one item. 55
B. The 609(2) Motor Vehicle Exemption-A Case Study in
"Stacking"
Montana debtors have made almost every conceivable
argument to allow stacking of the motor vehicle exemption.
Four separate cases illustrate the principal arguments Montana
joint debtors have made for exemption stacking. The factual
situations are similar in that joint debtors each claimed an
exemption in one jointly owned motor vehicle. In each case the
bankruptcy trustee argued that exemption stacking should not
be permitted.
The first Montana bankruptcy case dealing with the motor
vehicle exception was In re Miller.56 Joint debtors argued that §
25-13-609(2) and 11 U.S.C § 522(m) entitled each debtor to a
$1,200 exemption in a jointly owned vehicle. 57 The court found
that Montana exemptions did not have to be given separately to
each debtor because the Montana code did not contain specific
authorization for each debtor to receive a separate set of
exemptions in a joint case. 58 The court further held that
although the statute referred to "judgment debtor" in the
singular, the definition should apply to joint judgment debtors
Thus, the court
because of statutory definitional rules. 59
sustained the objection of the trustee, and allowed only one
60
exemption of $1,200 in a single motor vehicle.
In 1991, the Montana Bankruptcy Court decided In re
Arnold,6 1 where joint debtors each claimed an exemption of
$1,200 in separate vehicles. 62 The trustee argued that joint
debtors could only exempt $1,200 in one motor vehicle between
them.63 The court found that each judgment debtor in a joint
case could claim a $1,200 motor vehicle exemption because § 2513-609(2) allows a "judgment debtor" a $1,200 exemption in one

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
6 Mont. B.R. 96 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id. This holding was reaffirmed in In re Ripper, 14 Mont. B.R. 525 (1995).
10 Mont. B.R. 170 (1991).
Id. at 171.
Id.
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motor vehicle. 64 Although the court permitted each debtor to
claim a separate motor vehicle exemption, it did not authorize
stacking both exemptions in one jointly held motor vehicle.
In 1996, in In re Grove,65 joint debtors each claimed a $1,200
66
motor vehicle exemption in the same 1992 Chevrolet Cavalier.
The court reaffirmed that joint debtors who are co-owners of a
motor vehicle are entitled to exempt only $1,200 in one motor
vehicle. 67 In addition to reiterating the Miller holding, the court
further addressed the relationship of the parties as co-owners of
the property. The court stated that whether debtors hold a
motor vehicle as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as
tenants in common, each tenant enjoys the right to possession
and use of the vehicle during their lives. 68 The court deemed
that the "judgment debtor's interest" in the vehicle consisted of
the tenants' joint possession and use. 69 This joint interest was
then subject to the exemption limit of $1,200.70
Finally, in the case In re Garvin,71 the court addressed the
debtors' argument that previous Montana bankruptcy case law
72
was inconsistent and not supported by statutory authority.
The court first reviewed the history of the automobile exemption
in Montana. It concluded joint debtors in Montana bankruptcies
are subject to the exemption limitation in § 25-13-609(2), and
should not be allowed to each claim a motor vehicle exemption in
a jointly held vehicle. 73 The court presumed that the Montana
Legislature was familiar with the allowance of separate
exemptions for debtors under 11 U.S.C. § 522(m). 74 The court
felt it was not appropriate to "redraft the statutes to render it
more grammatically correct or more to the Court's personal
predilection."7 5 However, the court also implored the legislature
to clarify the exemption laws under § 25-13-609.76

64. Arnold, 10 Mont. B.R. at 176.
65. 15 Mont. B.R. 131 (1996).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 133.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 262 B.R. 529 (Bankr. Mont. 2001).
72. Id. at 532.
73. Id. at 533.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Atwell v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 670 F.2d 272, 286 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)).
76. In re Garvin, 262 B.R. at 534.
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span, the Montana
Throughout this thirteen-year
§ 25-13-609(2) and
interpreted
Bankruptcy Court consistently
followed its own precedent when examining motor vehicle
exemption stacking. While joint debtors could each claim an
exemption in a separate motor vehicle,7 7 they could not stack
that exemption on a jointly held motor vehicle. 78 The Montana
Legislature never altered this consistent holding through any
statutory amendment. Until the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in Zimmerman, the law in Montana regarding
exemptions remained well-delineated with respect to the motor
vehicle exemption in § 25-13-609(2).
C. Tools of the Trade "Stacking"-TheLegislatureSpeaks
The Montana Bankruptcy Court permitted stacking the
"tools of the trade" exemption of § 25-13-609(3) in two separate
The Montana Legislature
cases between 1987 and 1989.
subsequently amended the statute in order to disallow stacking.
The following discussion traces these two cases and the
subsequent legislative amendment.
In In re Cabrera,79 the Montana Bankruptcy Court
considered the $3,000 value limitation of exemptions under § 2513-609(3).80 The statute at that time read as follows:
A judgment debtor is entitled to exemption from execution of the
following:
(3) the judgment debtor's interest, not to exceed $3,000 in
value, in:
(a) any implements;
(b) professional books; or
(c) tools of the trade of the judgment debtor or a
dependent of the judgment debtor...Sl

The debtor argued he could exempt $3,000 in each of the
83
The Small Business Administration
listed categories.8 2

77. See In re Arnold, 10 Mont. B.R. 170, 176 (1991).
78. See In re Miller, 6 Mont. B.R. 96, 98 (1988); In re Grove, 15 Mont. B.R. 131, 133
(1996); In re Garvin, 262 B.R. 529, 533 (Bankr. Mont. 2001).
79. 96 B.R. 304 (Bankr. Mont. 1988).
80. Id. at 305.
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-609(3) (1987).
82. Cabrera, 96 B.R. at 305.
83. The Cabrera decision arose as a result of the debtor's motion to avoid a lien on
some business property. The Small Business Administration (SBA) was the lienholder,
thus they acted as the opposing party in this decision.
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responded that $3,000 was an aggregate value limitation.8 4 The
court emphasized the disjunctive structure of the list and
85
permitted a $3,000 limitation in each category.
In In re Mutchler,8 6 the court revisited the question of
whether a debtor could exempt up to $3,000 in each category of
property under § 25-13-609(3). The court reiterated its finding
that the subsection did not expressly indicate $3,000 as an
aggregate number.8 7 Therefore, the debtor could exempt up to
$3,000 in each of the listed categories and stack the "tools of the
88
trade" exemption.
In 1989, Senate Bill 135 amended § 25-13-609(3) to read in
pertinent part:
A judgment debtor is entitled to exemption from execution of the
following:...
(3) the judgment debtor's interest, not to exceed $3,000 in
aggregate value, in any implements, professional books, and

tools, of the trade of the judgment debtor or a dependent of the
judgment debtor...s9
Senator Mike Halligan, the sponsor of the amending bill, stated
the bill was "a result of some district court decisions on
bankruptcy." 90 Further testimony on the bill confirms this.91
Through the 1989 statutory amendment, the Montana
Legislature changed the statute to apply to the aggregate
amount in order to disallow the "stacking" approved by the
Montana Bankruptcy Court in Cabrera and Mutchler, thereby
indicating its intent as to the ability to stack an exemption for

84. Cabrera,96 B.R. at 305.
85. Id.
86. 95 B.R. 748 (Bankr. Mont. 1989).
87. Id. at 756.
88. Id. While the court permitted "tools of the trade" exemption stacking, it
disallowed personal property exemption stacking under § 25-13-609(1) because the
statute indicated that $4,500 of personal property was an aggregate amount. The court
instead found that each joint debtor could exempt different personal property items up to
$600 with the total of all exempt items totaling $4,500. Mutchler, 95 B.R. at 754-55.
89. 1989 Mont. Laws 130.
90. Minutes, Hearing on S.B. 135 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1989
Leg., 51st Sess. 1 (Mont. Jan. 19, 1989).
91. The Montana Credit Unions League had been involved with both the study and
hearings that ultimately led to the final version of § 25-13-609 in 1987. Bob Pyfer,
representing the Montana Credit Unions League, stated that "SB 135 clarifies the
original intent" of the Legislature when enacting § 25-13-609. Minutes, supra note 90, at
2. Ralph Kirscher, now the current Bankruptcy Judge for the U.S. District of Montana,
also testified in favor of the amendments because "interpretations by Judge Peterson
indicated that the current statute is stacked so the $3,000 can be used for each
subclassification." Id.
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implements, professional books, and tools.
IV. THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT'S INCONSISTENT TREATMENT

OF § 25-13-609
The Montana Supreme Court has addressed § 25-13-609 in
four separate cases since its enactment in 1987.92 Only two are
relevant to this note. 93 A comparison of the two relevant cases
illustrates the shift in policy in Zimmerman.
In In re Estate of Sandvig,94 the Montana Supreme Court
specifically focused on the motor vehicle exemption under § 2513-609(2). A couple had filed for bankruptcy protection and had
listed the husband's truck as their exempt vehicle, but had
neglected to list any exemption in an old Model A Ford that was
95
part of an estate to which the couple was heir.
The Sandvig court recognized that the underlying purpose
of the Montana exemption scheme is to strike a balance between
the debtor's need to maintain a livelihood and the creditor's
ability to collect money. 96 The court stated the statute granted
an exemption in only one motor vehicle and did not authorize an
exemption in all of the couple's motor vehicles. 97 The couple had
elected to exempt the husband's vehicle. 98 The court concluded
that "granting an additional election would create a windfall for
appellants .99
The most recent Montana Supreme Court case dealing with

92. The four cases are Berry v. Seman, 245 Mont. 335, 801 P.2d 589 (1990); In re
Estate of Sandvig, 250 Mont. 220, 819 P.2d 184 (1991); Dorwart v. Caraway, 1998 MT
191, 290 Mont. 196, 966 P.2d 1121; and In re Zimmerman, 2002 MT 90, 309 Mont. 337,
46 P.3d 599.
93. The two cases not relevant to this note are Berry v. Seman and Dorwart v.
Caraway. Berry decided whether an appeal was properly perfected from Justice Court to
District Court. § 25-13-609 was used to determine that the motor vehicle exemption
made a pledged motor vehicle insufficient surety to allow pursuit of the appeal. Dorwart
treated the issue of whether property should have been exempted from a sheriffs levy,
and whether the property exemption was a protected property right under the U.S and
Montana Constitutions. Dorwart claimed that the sheriff levied on property exempt
under § 25-13-609. While the Montana Supreme Court's holding that the § 25-13-609
personal property exemptions are protected property rights is important, it is not critical
to the analysis in this note.
94. 250 Mont. 220, 819 P.2d 184 (1991).
95. Sandvig, 250 Mont. at 222, 819 P.2d at 185.
96. Id.
97. Sandvig, 250 Mont. at 223, 819 P.2d at 186.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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The United States
§ 25-13-609 is In re Zimmerman. 0 0
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana presented seven
certified questions concerning the first three subparts of § 25-13609 to the Montana Supreme Court. 1 1 In four separate
bankruptcy proceedings, 10 2 married couples filed joint
bankruptcy petitions where each spouse claimed a separate set
of personal property exemptions. 10 3 The Bankruptcy Trustee
objected, arguing that joint debtors should be limited to a single
set of exemptions. 10 4 The Bankruptcy Court consolidated the
cases in order to certify the questions of law to the Montana
100. 2002 MT 90, 309 Mont. 337, 46 P.3d 599.
101. The certified questions were framed by the Bankruptcy Court as follows:
1. Are married debtors entitled to only one set of exemptions sunder MCA § 2513-609(1) in the several identified categories to an aggregate of $4,500, or is
each debtor regardless of marriage, entitled to claim a separate set of
exemptions in the identified categories?
2. Does joint or individual ownership of the personal property identified in the
categories described in MCA § 25-13-609(1) affect a debtor's ability to claim an
exemption?
3. If married debtors jointly own two (2) motor vehicles, may one debtor claim
an exemption in one vehicle and may the other debtor claim an exemption in
the other vehicle under MCA § 25-13-609(2)?
4. If married debtors jointly own one motor vehicle, may each debtor claim an
exemption of up to $2,500 in the one jointly owned vehicle under MCA § 25-13609(2), for a potential total exemption of $5,000 in one motor vehicle?
5. If married debtors individually own two (2) vehicles, may each debtor claim
an exemption in his or her individually owned vehicle under MCA § 25-13609(2)?
6. Are married debtors entitled to only one set of exemptions under MCA § 2513-609(3) in the three identified categories to an aggregate of $3,000, or is each
debtor, regardless of marriage, entitled to claim a separate set of exemptions in
the identified categories?
7. Does joint or individual ownership of the personal property identified in the
categories described in MCA § 25-13-609(3) affect a debtor's ability to claim an
exemption?
In re Zimmerman, 19 Mont. B.R. 153, 153-54 (2001) (hereinafter CertificationOrder).
However, these seven questions were reformulated by the Montana Supreme Court into
two issues:
1. May joint debtors in a bankruptcy proceeding each claim separate personal
property exemptions under Montana law?
2. May joint debtors in a bankruptcy proceeding each claim a separate
exemption for a jointly owned item of personal property?
Zimmerman, 2002 MT 90, 1% 4-5.
102. The Certification Order lists four joint debtors as having their cases
consolidated for purposes of certifying questions of law to the Montana Supreme Court.
However, the Montana Supreme Court decision lists only three joint debtors in the case
heading. It is unknown to the author why four cases are listed as consolidated in the
Certification Orderand only three appear in the Montana Supreme Court decision.
103.
CertificationOrder, 19 Mont. B.R. at 154-56.
104. Zimmerman, 2.
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Supreme Court. 10 5
In In re Zimmerman,10 6 the Montana Supreme Court
directly addressed whether joint debtors in a bankruptcy
proceeding each may claim separate personal property
exemptions under Montana law, and if so, whether they may
each claim a separate exemption for a jointly owned item of
property. 0 7 The court first addressed whether each debtor in a
joint proceeding was entitled to a separate set of exemptions.
The trustee argued that Montana's bankruptcy exemption
scheme was patterned after the federal provisions.10 8
The
trustee asserted that the legislature's failure to enact a section
similar to 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) indicated its intent to limit joint
debtors to one set of exemptions. 0 9
The court instead found that the legislature intended to
allow joint debtors separate sets of exemptions by simply
referring to the language of the Montana statute." 0 Using the
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY as a guide,"' the court found
that each individual in a Montana joint bankruptcy proceeding
may claim separate personal property exemptions. 112 Holding
that joint debtors each may claim separate exemptions is not
controversial, 1 3 because it follows federal treatment of

exemptions in bankruptcy," 4 the law of a majority of states, 115
and Montana Bankruptcy Court precedent. 116
The Zimmerman court then established that where each
debtor maintains an interest in jointly held personal property,
each may claim a separate exemption and stack those
exemptions on that one piece of property." 7 The court reasoned
when two people jointly own a piece of property each person
owns an equal share in that property." 8 Thus, the court found
that each debtor could claim a separate exemption on the piece
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Certification Order, 19 Mont. B.R. at 153.
2002 MT 90, 309 Mont. 337, 46 P.3d 599.
Id. at 1 4-5.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 11.
See also supra text accompanying note 26.
Zimmerman, 18.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
See, eg, 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (2000).
See also supra text accompanying note 12.
In re Arnold, 10 Mont. B.R. 170 (1991). See also discussion supra Part III.B.
Zimmerman, 16.
Id.
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of property. 119 The stacking issue was not extensively briefed by
the parties and the conclusion does not incorporate previous
Montana precedent. 120 A seemingly cursory review of the
statute is probably not sufficient justification of the court's
haphazard finding.
The Zimmerman holding directly conflicts with the
statement from Sandvig that "granting an additional election
would create a windfall for appellants.' 2 1 As some scholars
have noted, exemption stacking may provide married debtors
with an unduly large exemption at their creditor's expense.
Under this reasoning exemption stacking goes beyond the "fresh
start" envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code, and instead provides
1 22
the debtors with a "running start."
The Montana Supreme Court has tipped the scales in favor
of debtors when balancing "the debtor's need to maintain a
livelihood through rehabilitation while doing as little damage as
possible to the creditor's ability to collect money."1 23 The
Zimmerman court effectively reversed thirteen years of
consistent bankruptcy court precedent without any significant
discussion.
The Zimmerman court also ignored previous
legislative action taken as a direct result of the Montana
Bankruptcy Court ruling permitting tools of the trade exemption
stacking under § 25-13-609(3).
The legislature indicated pursuant to its 1989 statutory
amendment that it does not approve of stacking exemptions
under Mont. Code Ann. § 25-13-609(3).124 It remains to be seen
whether it will approve of the Montana Supreme Court's recent
stacking authorization in Zimmerman. If the ability to stack
exemptions amounts to a "windfall" to the debtors at the
expense of the creditors, legislative action may soon follow.
V. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE "STACKING" CONUNDRUM
Imposing a fixed dollar cash allotment for debtors could
grant debtors a "fresh start" and disallow a "windfall." One
119. Zimmerman, T 16.
120. See Trustee's Brief, Zimmerman (No. 01-333) and Debtor's Opening Brief,
Zimmerman (No. 01-333). While it is unknown what was said at oral argument
surrounding the 'stacking" of exemptions on one piece of property, neither brief
submitted to the court dedicated significant discussion to the issue of "stacking."
121. Sandvig, 250 Mont. at 223, 819 P.2d at 186
122. See Engledow, supra note 47, at 315 n.208.
123. Sandvig, 250 Mont. at 222, 819 P.2d at 185.
124. See discussion supraPart III.C.
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commentator suggested this alternative could create national
uniformity and fairness with regards
to bankruptcy
exemptions, 125 but it can also apply on the state level. A state
could specify a specific cash allotment for an "individual debtor"
and another for "joint debtors." By discontinuing the use of
specific exemptions, each debtor could use the fixed dollar
amount to exempt whatever that person chooses. 126 After using
that amount, everything else remaining in the bankruptcy
estate would be applied to payment of creditors.
It is impossible for any legislature to separate bankruptcy
laws from political, social and economic considerations. 127
Competing interests of creditors and debtors create conflict in
the bankruptcy arena. 128
Although voters elect legislative
representatives, creditor interests have been much more
successful in lobbying efforts than any group of individual
debtors. 129
Thus, legislative exemption reform is often
130
somewhat skewed in favor of the creditor.
Commentators suggest that the first determination a court
should make when dealing with exemptions is whether the
statute is ambiguous. 13 The two separate courts charged with
application of Montana bankruptcy exemption law each made
133
this determination in In re Garvin132 and In re Zimmerman.
Although the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Zimmerman
stands as the definitive ruling, 34 the holdings of the two courts
were so different that legislative action is necessary to remedy
the inconsistency.
If the legislature sets fixed dollar amounts for both
individual and joint debtors, courts would not have to deal with
questions of stacking and what constitutes a "windfall." A
bright line rule would allow fair and simple disbursement of the
125. See Engledow, supra note 47, at 316.
126. See id.
127. See Brown, supra note 8, at 152.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 162.
130. As previously mentioned, The Montana Credit Unions League (a creditor
organization) had been actively involved with both the study and hearings that
ultimately crafted the final version of § 25-13-609 that was enacted in 1987. See supra
text accompanying note 94.
131. See Dickerson, supra note 44, at 682.
132. 262 B.R. 529 (2001).
133. 2002 MT 90, 309 Mont. 337, 46 P.3d 599.
134. The Montana Supreme Court is "the final authority on the legal weight to be
given a presumption under Montana law." Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516
(1979).
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bankruptcy estate. Although this scheme may seem idealistic,
its simplicity, efficiency, and fairness are worth pursuing to
remedy the inconsistencies of Montana personal property
exemption case law.
A fixed dollar allotment could be considered as permitting
exemption stacking in a different form. While a fixed dollar
allotment may allow complete exemption of a valuable motor
vehicle or tool of the trade, the set allotment would also force
debtors to choose which personal property items to exempt. Any
personal property items that are not exempted would then be
distributed to creditors in satisfaction of their claims against the
bankruptcy estate. This process would strike a balance between
the clear Montana constitutional mandate to "enact liberal
exemption laws" and the need for a fair process for creditors.
VI. CONCLUSION

While the holding of the court in Zimmerman is not fatal to
interests of all creditors in Montana, its generalized holding
alters all future cases dealing with the issue of exemptions in
Montana. The court's holding that joint debtors may stack two
135
exemptions in one item of jointly owned personal property
creates a "windfall" that grants a "running start" to joint
debtors.
Through the Zimmerman holding, the Montana Supreme
Court has created a significant change in Montana exemption
law. Previous Montana case law dealing with exemptions
established the rule that one could not stack exemptions on
jointly owned property. The Montana Legislature previously
amended the statute to disallow exemption stacking when
permitted by the court. 136 Although exemptions should be
liberally construed in favor of debtors, 37 their application should
not result in inequitable treatment of creditors.
The
Zimmerman court overstepped its bounds of interpretation 3 8 by
permitting debtors to stack personal property exemptions.
Instead of considering consistent precedent and legislative
action, the court cursorily reviewed the statutory language, and
135. In re Zimmerman, 2002 MT 90, 16, 2002 Mont. 90, 16, 46 P.3d 599, 16.
136. See discussion supra Part III.B.
137. See MacDonald v. Mercill, 220 Mont. 146, 151, 714 P.2d 132, 134 (1986).
138. Title 3, chapter 2, part 204, subpart (3) of the Montana Code charges the
Montana Supreme Court to "pass upon and determine all the questions of law involved
in the case presented upon such appeal and necessary to the final determination of the
case."
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significantly changed Montana's bankruptcy exemption scheme.
The Montana Legislature should now restore balance to the area
of personal property exemptions in bankruptcy by adopting a
bright line rule that will allow debtors a "fresh start," but not a
"windfall" at the expense of creditors.
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